by James Travers-Murison - has a degree in American and Asian history minoring in psychology and a Law degree at Monash University and a diploma from the Australian College Kashmir , Pakistan , Kurdish Turkey , Israel , Zimbabwe , Yugoslasvia and Iran accounts in London and as a journalist for Canberra Times, Darwin WIN, OPTUS cable TV and Channel 31 in Australia
PREFACE:
In the light of American military involvement in Iraq and atrocities committed there by US Forces this article questions how soldiers were led into committing the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War. It looks at how My Lai happened and who was responsible. Whether there was a conspiracy to wipe out the village? It examines when a soldier has a duty to disobey an order to commit an atrocity. It looks to see how this kind of tragedy can be avoided by informing the military and general public of the reasons behind the worst case scenario of command failure. In this respect it indirectly looks at how this situation can be avoided by properly educating our soldiers on what is and is not an acceptable order given by a commander and briefly touches upon the possibility of a model to be developed by the army, which would democratise and empower individual soldiers within the command structure through involving more consensus decision-making. Finally it very briefly considers what standards should be applied to a War Crimes Tribunal in dealing with East Timor, Iraq and other world conflicts.
An old Vietnamese man and survivor toils in a rice paddy that is emerald green, thinking about what happened many, many years ago on that field to women and children by soldiers of the great wealthy democracy that was sent to protect them.
‘Remembering the horror of war and pointless killing, one should not forget the crimes of War committed by the side we were on.’ Bertrand Russell
The atrocities of war may be considered ill to dwell upon, and seem of little if any relevance in today’s New World Order of peace. Yet for all our veneer of civilisation there is “a world out there” that engages in barbaric behaviour as we have seen on our television screens showing Afghanistan, Iraq and many other developing countries . The killing of tourists in Cambodia and Kashmir, the massacres in Rwanda, Bosnia and Chechnya and even the terrorist attacks still in Israel and once so close to home in Northern Ireland Port Arthur Hoddle Street Queen Street, Lindt Café America Iraq Australia
Though Serbians are being put before this court there is no doubt an issue of double standards when atrocities are clearly being committed under international law standards by United States Forces in at least Iraq, if not in Guantanamo Bay and other secret detention centres and no-one is prepared to stand up and confront the United States for its breaches of at very least the Geneva Convention for which the Western Democracies defended against the tyranny of Nazism and Fascism at such a very great price. But this is not the first time that the United States in recent history has flaunted international law and conventions with devastating results to other countries and itself not least in Latin America, what is truly stunning is that Nation has learnt so little from its recent history. The World's current super power may in fact be its worst enemy and with it having a major gun problem and a crime rate 20 times worse than Japan and at the bottom of the Western nations, the indicators are that something very rotten and evil exists in the core of America's soul that needs redressing to restore confidence on this planet in decency and human dignity. And the answer to this may well explain the sense of inequality in the World that led to the attacks that instigated the 'War on Terror' and provide the answer to resolving the age old conflict between Islam and Christianity. It may well explain how Mullah's implicit commands and preaching to their faithful led disillusioned extremist groups to take action in their own hands out of proportion to the teachings of their leaders. Very much in the same fashion as US soldiers responded to their commanders when put in a basically immoral conflict at its core. Preventing atrocities by your own troops is essential to a moral civilisation. We detest the actions of ISIS in the Middle East and although atrocities by the US and Western forces pale into insignificance compared to more primitive nations, unless we can set the example to others of impeccable human decency and morality, we are in grave danger of reaping the gross barbarity of those on this planet that are of a more primal nature than us.
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MY LAI
It is in this light that I revisited a closed investigation into something that touched me with great fear when I was a child, ‘The Vietnam War’ and in particular, not that I was aware of it, the worst known massacre ever perpetrated by American troops overseas. Much later the ethics of guerrilla warfare and legitimised killing, of military command structures that control the actions of ordinary human beings, and how it can lead people ‘into tragic situations’, began to dominate my thoughts. This led me on to look at this the worst known official atrocity committed by English-speaking military forces in modern Western history.
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The My Lai story begins in 1968 as social revolution rocked Europe . The Beatles, the Doors, LSD, hash and flower power descended on humanities collective consciousness and in a small village in Vietnam called My Lai ...
On March 16th 1968 at exactly 7.30 am, nine US Army helicopters drifted lazily through clouds of thick white phosphorus smoke left by a preparatory artillery deployment and landed gently at the Western edge of a small hamlet in South Vietnam My Lai (4) or Pinkville. It had contained about 500 inhabitants, but there were less people since the communist militia, the Vietcong (VC), had established themselves in the area. They had recruited most of the people of military age, so those left were mostly old men, women and children.1 The American GIs had been told it was market day and that most of the civilians would be away. Some villagers were finishing breakfast.
Captain Medina of C Company reported the Landing Zone (LZ) as “cold”, but a helicopter pilot radioed that they were receiving fire, that it was “hot”. Medina Medina
The platoon encountered no resistance as it approached the southern half of the village. When some of his men heard a noise just before the first huts they turned and shot. They shot a buffalo. The large Asian beast fell, but the soldiers did not stop shooting. “From then on it was like nobody could stop. Everyone was just shooting at everything and anything, like the ammo wouldn't ever give out”.3 These were one private soldier's words that came out at General Peer's Inquiry.
A
As they moved into Xom Lang they shot many fleeing Vietnamese and bayoneted others. They burned crops and houses, destroyed livestock, and threw hand grenades into bunkers. Then they rounded up women, children and old men. Some were shot in the groups they formed, the rest were moved along trails to the south and southeastern edge of the village. Calley ordered one group of 20 to 50 peasants “to be taken care of”.4 They were led to a place 20 yards south of the village and put under guard. He charged up and yelled, “Why haven't you taken care of these people... I mean kill them”.5 He and Sergeant Meadlo opened fire on them. About 8.30 he reported to Medina Medina
Another platoon, the 2nd, had moved into the north of the village. Some women were raped and they also began to torch huts and houses. At 8.30 Medina
Most of the remaining villagers at My Lai were gradually herded to the edge of a canal about 100 yards east of the hamlet by 1st Platoon. Official US Army figures admitted 75 to 150 were forced there although it was probably in excess of 200.7
In this time Calley shot one child and rifle butted a priest in the face. He fired point blank into his head. Calley walked to the canal reaching it at about 9. About this time Medina
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Some of the dead Vietnamese civilians
At 9.15 Medina Medina Medina
The pilot returned later, perhaps 9.45 to 10.00 and spotted from his ‘chopper’ more children caught in a bunker with American soldiers running towards them. Thompson radioed again for help. He landed his helicopter between the bunker and the soldiers. He got out to rescue the children. One of the Americans on the ground was Lt. Calley. He rushed forward and tried to stop Thompson. After a heated argument Thompson told his waistgunner, Lawrence Colburn, to aim his machine gun “at that officer and if the officer intervenes to shoot him”.11 Shortly after this Medina Medina
At about 10.00 Medina
Despite this incredible anomaly, given the large enemy kills being reported, the company commander, Medina
As is often the case in bloodshed there were moments of humanity. Several soldiers refused to fire a shot, and one GI even directed villagers to safety. But the only US
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Why did American soldiers commit such atrocities and how was it that no commander stopped them? General Peer's investigation ended by giving nine reasons for the massacre. One of the major reasons he gave was the lack of proper training within C Company. They had been in Vietnam Vietnam
However contrary to much of the evidence C Company performed well in training in Hawaii
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Water buffalo play with Vietnamese children
In Calley’s defence, he stated that the G.I.s considered the Vietnamese peasants to be basically sub-human. ‘Gook’, ‘dink’, or ‘slope’ was a general term used for all Vietnamese, not just the VC. Furthermore this was a VC sympathetic area. Most of the mines and booby traps had been set by local villagers including women and children. Often villagers would watch or even direct U.S.
At Loc Son on the 24th February Task Force Barker had lost another man and had fifteen injured. Col. Henderson complained bitterly about the unit’s failure to close with the enemy and lack of aggression.17A Medina U.S. Medina My Lai (4).
The 48th VC was one of the best VC battalions in South Vietnam
The commanders in Task Force Barker played upon the fear the soldier’s felt. There was no attempt to enforce Division policies, either before or after My Lai , on treatment of prisoners, civilians or respect of their property. C Company had a record of rapes, mistreatment and killing of civilians.20 South Vietnamese government officials not only knew this was going on, but encouraged it. Medina
Lt. Col. Barker, Task Force Commander, gave orders to his Company commanders that contributed to the tragedy. His instructions were to burn and destroy the village, close in and kill “all the enemy”. He called for the use of artillery and gunships on the western edge of the village without proper authorisation. He gave no instructions as to the handling of civilians; in fact he stated they would be out of the village as it was market day.23 He told the commanders to expect heavy casualties as they were ‘going in’ against one of the most dangerous VC units in the area with three or perhaps four hundred VC under its command.24 By the time this had been channelled down to Medina he told his troops that there were only enemy in My Lai (4) and according to the testimony of many of his soldiers, “all were to be killed”.25
The 48th Local Defence battalion was not in My Lai (4). It was probably not even in nearby Son My, but instead 15 kms to the west of Quang Ngai in the mountains. Further, the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) Provincial HQ were aware of this as did three separate American sources including the Americal Division, yet the CIA Phoenix operative in Quang Ngai, Robert Ramsdall, who backed the mission, mysteriously claimed no knowledge of this.25A The 48th had in fact been depleted by ARVN troops in its Tet Offensive on Quang Ngai. C Company had watched the remains of the 48th escape at Nui Dang De, unable to attack because the area the VC were moving through was under ARVN control.25B This was in the Tra Khuc Valley which approached My Lai .
It remains a mystery why US Intel recorded it at full strength and in My Lai , unless someone gave false information to US Intel. Ramsdall had black listed most of the village as VC sympathisers. Ramsdell was fat, 45, wore a beret and carried a Swedish submachine gun. His interrogation centre gained a notoriety that caused Dr Margaret Nelson to complain to a congressional hearing of the dozens of cases of torture.25C “He exuded confidence to the point of arrogance”, such that he boasted he knew through his informers when a GI truck had driven too fast through a village.25D After the operation his blacklist was reduced considerably.26 Captain Krotouc, the intelligence officer of the Task Force, also mysteriously got his information wrong. It was not market day when they attacked.
Stew Harris, who now lives in L.A.
“We were essentially co-located with it. There was a stretch of land that ran from Cape Batangan south about twenty miles and inland about eight miles to Highway l that -- as John Tegtmeier told you -- ARVN never went and US forces entered only on special occasions (with South Vietnamese consent under Operation Muscatine). For a year, on most nights the only organised 'friendly' base in this entire area was Coastal Group 16: four U.S. Navy types with about 80 Vietnamese Navy (VN) sailors. The 48th AKA (84) moved through this area for resupply, recruitment, and general hellraising.”
I asked him if he had come across Task Force Barker, or any men in it?
“I met Medina My Lai … I had the opportunity to visit My Lai after Calley (had committed the atrocity) and before the story became known. With one other American sailor and about ten VN sailors, we crossed the river roughly two kilometers inland, walked north through the various villages and returned the coast where one of our boats picked us up. It took about three hours. We didn't fire on anyone and no one fired on us. No booby traps. We didn't burn anything, although we did search a lot of bunkers, concluding they were for ‘domestic’ use. On more than one occasion, I asked for and was given water by the locals. No incidents. As with most of the area, it was a respectable agricultural area denuded of draft age men. In truth, not much should be made of that fact. Whichever side controlled an area took all the draft age men. Only Saigon seemed to have some left over.”
“I was working in Silicon Valley when the story broke. I did not believe it. I even wrote my congressman, offering to testify. He declined, although he did hear from another Navy lieutenant, a certain John Kerry. But as more of the facts came out, I came to conclude that the incident in all its dirty detail did occur as alleged. My opinion in the end was that Calley should have been shot and Medina
“I am quite doubtful, however, of the conspiracy theory you develop. I must tell you that intelligence officers and their reports had very little impact on the field. The 'intel' was so bad that its purveyors had very little credibility. Quang Ngai (sector) issued a weekly Intel report that listed our base as 'VC controlled'. When I
complained, they upgraded the base to 'contested'. They also reported in almost every weekly update, that this would be the week the 48th over ran our "Junk Base". In his concluding report, the rotating sector S-2 added, "If they don't do it this week, I'll do it myself!" ”
complained, they upgraded the base to 'contested'. They also reported in almost every weekly update, that this would be the week the 48th over ran our "Junk Base". In his concluding report, the rotating sector S-2 added, "If they don't do it this week, I'll do it myself!" ”
Stew concluded by writing to me,
“Ramsdell is an unknown to me. I was not aware of any Phoenix
Nonetheless the Task Force Commanders ordered the attack by one understrength unit of 105 troops which had been in-country only three months, C Company, against a VC battalion estimated at least 280 men. B Company was held in reserve. A Company was being used as a blocking force to the north. The usual ratio for assault on a fortified position was three to one, however they were attacking irregulars, with considerable air and artillery support, and the fortifications were at the most tunnels, so these odds were not unusual in Vietnam
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Lt. Calley awaiting court martial
General Peers decided the principal cause of the massacre was ‘leadership failure’. Failure to follow and enforce established policy. He blames this on the command hierarchy’s reliance on reports of subordinates, poor co-ordination of communication and commander’s in helicopters who never once landed to check on the operation.27 Where were the troops’ overall commanders? Hovering a few thousand feet above covering several operations were General Koster, Colonel Henderson and Lt. Col. Barker. The houses looked like matchboxes and the people like small dots. Therefore the main commanders did not have proper control of the situation on the ground, and they made no investigation after indications a massacre had occurred. Peers blamed Medina
He said Medina Medina Vietnam
What Peers did not mention in his report, though he may have suspected it, was how ‘absolutely convenient’ it was that the commanders did not check the ground situation. That they may have actually chosen not to do so knowing the VC were not there. That they wilfully decided to exterminate a known VC sympathetic village with the help of the Phoenix My Lai in such a way that the extermination would occur and distanced themselves from it such that they could not be blamed. Is this perhaps the crucial difference that explains why this unit committed such an atrocity while no other American units did?29
Calley’s actions were systematic and organised. The grouping together of villagers and the herding of between two and three hundred people to the edge of the canal. The fact the massacre continued for over three hours alone suggests this. Circumstantial evidence of premeditated intent on Medina U.S.
Knowing this was an extremely resilient VC unit it seems hard to accept that he could have believed the reports of the VC casualties and no U.S.
Either Medina was blindly negligent in not following up the battle reports, or he was not sure whether the VC were there or not and when he realised they were not there he simply decided not to intervene. The other possibility is he knew the 48th VC was not there and he intended exactly what happened. Either way it is most likely Medina
Premeditated intent can also be implied from the nature of Medina Medina Medina
Yet this testimony of many of the soldiers that Medina
The Motive: On the 24th of previous month B Company had visited My Lai and walked out with one man dead and five injured. They had let civilians pass through their lines only to be shot to pieces from all directions; unable to retreat because of heavy sniper fire at their rear.34 Ramsdall, the Phoenix intelligence operative, probably was not as sure as he made out that the VC unit was there, which other U.S.
General Peer's did not believe that this United States Army unit's command hierarchy formed, or even considered such intent to commit mass murder. However he later said, “The full and true story of the My Lai incident has not yet been told” and that “there were numerous gaps and inconsistencies in the testimony before the Inquiry”.34B If in Task Force Baker the impossible occurred, then this was beyond a failure of leadership. The fragile balance of control the military system relies on would be under threat. The whole military command structure exists through the strict procedural following of the systems rules.
That a whole chain of command could have decided to put itself above those rules, ‘take the laws of war into their own hands’, to go against the principles in the Geneva Convention, then if this could happen once it could happen again. If this was the reason this occurred, then there was a flaw in the command structure of the Army. The flaw possibly occurring even up to the rank of Colonel was a lack of understanding of the moral legitimacy of a soldier’s actions in respect of killing civilians. During General Peer's Inquiry in 1970, troops were still fighting in Vietnam Vietnam
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Private Meadle during the Inquiry. He was one of Calley’s troops.
Psychological tests have proven there is no better pressure cooker than the army to bring out this sort of Pavlov dogs behaviour.35 Psychiatrist, William Gault concluded in his analysis of C Company that there is a tendency for natural dominance by the psychopath in human beings which Calley proved. The military system rests on control through leaders. It does not allow individuals to question, to think, or to judge whether an order is reasonable. In fact it does the opposite especially among lower ranks. Calley was not respected by Medina Medina
In his last operation against the VC, the colonel had complained about his failure to press the attack and instead always calling in air or fire support. To Calley these were the evil communists. These people, men, women and children were here to stop what was right and they were the enemy. 36 And more than this he had something to prove, that he was not a weak coward. Calley was probably terrified when he flew in knowing that he was under pressure by his superiors to make close and pursuing contact with the enemy. His credibility was on the line. So if Medina
The military system, combined with the lax mentality in Task Force Barker, allowed him to accept this order as reasonable and so he carried it out not realising it was wrong. Even at his trial he still insisted that he had not thought his acts wrong at the time.37 In 1991 the TV documentary ‘4 hours in My Lai’ Varnado Simpson said that he had executed 25 people there at the age of 19, confessed that what he had done was wrong though at the time it had seemed acceptable behaviour in the group. He said he had killed some by scalping, cutting their throat, cutting out tongues and cutting off hands. By 1991 he had attempted three suicides and was on strong anti-depressants.37A
Calley’s conviction that what he was doing was right may explain why almost all the soldiers did participate, yet often detesting to Calley and even crying as they pulled their triggers.38 Twenty years later in that TV documentary sergeant Kenneth Hodges said, “if one of my men had refused to shoot… he could have been shot on the spot for refusing an order in the face of the enemy… I feel we carried out our orders in a moral fashion, orders to destroy the village and killing the people in the village… and I feel we did not violate any moral standards”. Peers accepted that soldiers can behave like this when they are without good leadership, but he acknowledged that they have an ability to act morally, or at least should be expected to have such.
Some soldiers did refuse to participate such as Harry Stanley, a simple Afro-American, now working in a timber yard. “Calley told me I would be court-martialled, but I said this is wrong.” These people did disobey orders, which went against their moral conscience even despite threats to obey using military law. To this extent the evidence clearly points to orders being given to kill the civilians, but whether in such a spontaneous, uncontrollable occurrence as Peers suggests is not entirely clear from the evidence.39
On examining the evidence it seems unlikely that there was any conspiracy beforehand to exterminate the village on the part of anyone other than Calley and Medina My Lai . They had encountered many VC already in the area and had directed operations against what they believed was the 48th several times in the previous month. Barker was notorious for not detailing operations and not following up – he would draw operations with a stick into the dusty earth at LZ Dottie.
Ramsdell appears simply to have been overconfident and inexperienced in his Intel assessment. He had not even met Barker. The infamous investigative journalist, Seymour Hersh spoke to Ramsdell and was convinced he was all bravado, cruel and incompetent, but had not planned the massacre. The evidence of Greg Olsen is so strong in support of Medina Medina Medina Medina
Richard Hammer, the anti-war journalist, blamed mass hysteria rather than premeditated orders. The idea was too repugnant that American officers could order such a mass slaughter.40 He blamed government and military policy in Vietnam Medina
The military machine was embarrassed by this massacre when the cover-up blew in late 1969 (due to the efforts of a soldier who wanted to become a journalist and was appalled by what he was hearing in the area, Ron Ridenhour). It did not want to consider a premeditated mass killing of civilians by its officers, the war was unpopular at home, morale was low and Nixon was attempting to leave Vietnam
Calley had his case specially reviewed by President Nixon and his sentence was reduced to 10 years. He was released on parole after five years house arrest.43 Politically the left was satisfied as they had seen Calley as a scapegoat for the military machine, and the right was appeased as they claimed he was only shooting at the ‘unseen’ enemy. The commanders of Task Force Barker walked free. The system was more than lenient to those responsible at My Lai and even General Peer’s admitted in 1979 “in effect two standards were created - one for the enemy and one for ourselves”. 44
Have we learnt the lessons of My Lai?
Over thirty years later and ten years after I first started investigating this atrocity, war crimes still persist in the world yet as East Timor demonstrates international authorities remain mostly powerless still. Attempts to have Indonesian officers and soldiers testify before the War Crimes Tribunal were abandoned due to political interference. They don't have to answer why they obeyed orders to kill East Timor civilians just like the US Army soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan who committed documented war crimes don't. Any judgement by such a Tribunal should bare in mind the standards applied by the United States in prosecuting the My Lai atrocity. They should also bare in mind the confusion surrounding military operations where an uncontrolled civilian militia operates. For at My Lai this maelstrom of fear, misinformation, poor Intel and ultimately barbarity occurred in one of the most technically sophisticated armies in the world.
Thompson, the chopper pilot and now a veterans counsellor has finally been recognised as a hero and was awarded the Soldiers Medal exactly thirty years later. The Pentagon wanted a private ceremony, but Thompson insisted that it be held on the anniversary and at the Vietnam Memorial in Washington My Lai is beginning to be learned. But not it seems by the US government as "Ambassador to Vietnam and former Florida Congressman Douglas "Pete" Peterson declined the opportunity for the U.S. Embassy to participate in a ceremony at My Lai on March 16, 1998 (the 30th anniversary of the massacre) honoring two American citizens, Captain Hugh Thompson and Lawrence Colburn, for their actions in attempting to stop the massacre. In a letter dated October 14, 1997, Peterson stated that "neither the policy objectives of the United States nor the current relations between the U.S. and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam would be served by Embassy participation.", " said Mike Boehm. He felt America was not sufficiently integrating the lesson of My Lai into its institutional memory.
Lieutenant Christopher Biow who was in the U.S. Navy, when I interviewed him over the Internet wrote, “while there may have been some evolution within US military approach to command in this direction, I suspect it is mostly unrelated to the essential lessons of My Lai. Yes, in my opinion there definitely should be more direct addressing of My Lai, not only in military training, but also in secondary schooling of children. Every child should do a thorough case study of what went on, along with the legal background of "duty to refuse." I believe that My Lai could happen again, due to our failure to address it in military and civilian education.” However he was not convinced of a conspiracy theory, nor were any U.S. military personnel I contacted.
Until the developed nations such as Australian and United States Armed Forces introduce, with great pain, a radically new command system with democratic training by conferral and mediation in decision making and therefore “in the making of orders” there is no guarantee that another My Lai will not occur - in fact Iraq and the atrocities committed there by US Forces indicate the complete failure of learning the lessons of My Lai in the United States Army. Properly educating soldiers on the moral limits of their commander’s authority should be of prime importance. Critics who would complain of its cumbersome consensus approach and anti-authoritarian nature would be answered in time with very positive results in morale and efficiency, as many corporations who have adopted such management strategies in work practices are finding out in civilian life. Many including my father argued against such changes as they said it was hard enough to get soldiers to obey any orders properly and strict discipline is necessary where lives are at stake and urgent action is required without question in order for a commander to function efficiently. Those are valid points, but because something is difficult doesn't mean it should not be done. Research needs to be made into finding a system that will allow a commander's orders to be obeyed especially in combat situations, yet also allows troops to give feedback and the ability to question or refuse in extreme circumstances without repercussions, an order. And also to report safely an order that is a war crime. Educating the troops in how to deal with these situations and also allow the smooth flow of a unit is essential. That starts with educating and maintaining an attitude within all units of a strong ethical morality and duty to act decently with humanity and to understand that the prime role of the unit is to protect civilians, avoid violence except to dedicated targets and to help the nation they have been sent to. Much of this is already in place and many units act with great decency and high morality, but often it is simply ignored by some. This means that there needs to be some process to monitor units to assess if they are abiding by these guidelines and rules, take them very seriously and there is a process of accountability with repercussions. If the Army has been sent to another nation in a way that is not working to help that nation, is not fully justified, is not based upon having that nation protect itself, is not based on a regional solution involving all parties, with the nations in the region involved in the peace keeping process, then this also is a very strong factor in undermining the morale of units and leading to war crimes.
Lieutenant Christopher Biow who was in the U.S. Navy, when I interviewed him over the Internet wrote, “while there may have been some evolution within US military approach to command in this direction, I suspect it is mostly unrelated to the essential lessons of My Lai. Yes, in my opinion there definitely should be more direct addressing of My Lai, not only in military training, but also in secondary schooling of children. Every child should do a thorough case study of what went on, along with the legal background of "duty to refuse." I believe that My Lai could happen again, due to our failure to address it in military and civilian education.” However he was not convinced of a conspiracy theory, nor were any U.S. military personnel I contacted.
In 1993 Canadian peacekeepers in Somalia tortured and murdered local civilians. And 3rd Royal Australian Regiment was accused in early 2000s of covering up use of brutality in disciplining its troops due to what has been considered a failure in the military system of justice. This brutality was a result of rough justice condoned by commanders within the unit. Abu Grabi prison in Iraq, and many examples in Iraq and Afghanistan indicate the lessons have not been learned properly. Nothing as extreme as My Lai has occurred and soldiers are being severely prosecuted for misconduct, however the preventative measures are not good enough in training the soldiers and in the operational command structure. In Afghanistan one US Army unit's Sargent was off his own bat secretly ordering his platoon to commit atrocities with threats of death if soldiers revealed this. Soldiers effectively forced to commit these crimes were still severely punished by the US Army when it was exposed. The point is that the command structure failed these men who were put in an horrendous situation by a few psychopaths. Even if processes were in place to complain the attitude in the company was far from conducive to accept the complaint due to an entrenched mentality of brutality, rather than seeking to avert violence and help the people they were sent to protect.
Until the developed nations such as Australian and United States Armed Forces introduce, with great pain, a radically new command system with democratic training by conferral and mediation in decision making and therefore “in the making of orders” there is no guarantee that another My Lai will not occur - in fact Iraq and the atrocities committed there by US Forces indicate the complete failure of learning the lessons of My Lai in the United States Army. Properly educating soldiers on the moral limits of their commander’s authority should be of prime importance. Critics who would complain of its cumbersome consensus approach and anti-authoritarian nature would be answered in time with very positive results in morale and efficiency, as many corporations who have adopted such management strategies in work practices are finding out in civilian life. Many including my father argued against such changes as they said it was hard enough to get soldiers to obey any orders properly and strict discipline is necessary where lives are at stake and urgent action is required without question in order for a commander to function efficiently. Those are valid points, but because something is difficult doesn't mean it should not be done. Research needs to be made into finding a system that will allow a commander's orders to be obeyed especially in combat situations, yet also allows troops to give feedback and the ability to question or refuse in extreme circumstances without repercussions, an order. And also to report safely an order that is a war crime. Educating the troops in how to deal with these situations and also allow the smooth flow of a unit is essential. That starts with educating and maintaining an attitude within all units of a strong ethical morality and duty to act decently with humanity and to understand that the prime role of the unit is to protect civilians, avoid violence except to dedicated targets and to help the nation they have been sent to. Much of this is already in place and many units act with great decency and high morality, but often it is simply ignored by some. This means that there needs to be some process to monitor units to assess if they are abiding by these guidelines and rules, take them very seriously and there is a process of accountability with repercussions. If the Army has been sent to another nation in a way that is not working to help that nation, is not fully justified, is not based upon having that nation protect itself, is not based on a regional solution involving all parties, with the nations in the region involved in the peace keeping process, then this also is a very strong factor in undermining the morale of units and leading to war crimes.
Peasant women of My Lai show the canal where
And what of My Lai ? Truong Thi Le lost nine members of her family – father, mother, brothers and daughter – while she hid in a paddy field. She said, “I won’t forgive. I hate them very much. I won’t forgive them as long as I live.” Michael Boehm, a veteran, has helped start the My Lai Peace Park My Lai and the U.S. Marquette elementary school children is healing the wounds.
Anderson, David, Facing My Lai; Univ. Press Kansas
Bilton, Michael and Sim, Kevin, Four Hours in My Lai, London; Viking, 1992 and Yorkshire Television documentary 1989.
Calley, William Laws, Body Count, London ; Hutchinson
Di Mona, Joseph, Great Court-Martial Cases New York
Hammer, Richard, One Morning in the War, London ; Rupert Hart Davis
Hersh, Seymour M., Cover Up New York
Lewy, Guenter , America in Vietnam , New York
McCarthy, Mary Therese, The Seventeenth Degree, New York
Peers, Lt.Gen. W.A., The My Lai Inquiry, New York
Thanks also to John Tegtmeier Co B, 3/21, 196th LIB and Aeroscout Company, 123rd Aviation Battalion, Americal Division 1967/1968, who is now Director of the Vietnam War Internet Project and Stew Harris, who was Senior Advisor, Coastal Group 16, Quang Ngai province in 1968.
1 R.Hammer, One Morning in the War (1970) pp.43-56
2 W.R. Peers, The My Lai Enquiry (1979) p.172
3 Hammer, op cit. p.121 evidence of soldier 1st Platoon
4 Ibid. pp.134-137
5 S.Di Mona, Great Court Martial Cases (1972) p.251
6 M.McCarthy, The 17th Degree (1974) p.387
6A Hammer, op.cit. p.128
7 Di Mona, op.cit. p.261
7A Di Mona, op.cit. p.261
8 Peers, op.cit. p.176
9 Hammer, op.cit. pp.138-149
10 McCarthy, op.cit. p.392
11 Hammer, op.cit. pp.138-149
12 McCarthy, op.cit. p.386; S.Hersh, Cover Up (1972) p.113
13 Peers, op.cit. p.178
14 Ibid. p.178
15 Ibid. p.230; G.Lewy , America in Vietnam
16 Peers, op.cit. p.231; Lewy op.cit. p.329; Di Mona, op.cit. p.264; Bilton, 4 hours in My Lai (1992) p.84
16A Bilton, op.cit. p.92
17 Peers, op.cit. p.234
17AA Bilton and Sim,‘4 hours in My Lai’ TV documentary 1992
17A Bilton, op.cit. pp.85-87
18 W.Calley, Body Count (1971) pp.105-6
19 Peers, op.cit. p.236
20 Hammer, op.cit. pp.95-115
21 Ibid. pp.99-100
24 Ibid. p.71; Peers, op.cit. p.236
25A Bilton, op.cit. p.91
25B Ibid. p.70
25C Ibid. p.89
25D Ibid. p.89
27 Peers, op.cit. p.232
28 Ibid. p.233
29 B Company committed a similar but smaller scale massacre on the same day at My Khe 4, which suggests possible complicity at a higher command level – Ibid. Ch.16
30 Hammer, op.cit. pp.74,98
31 Hersh, op.cit. p.177
32 McCarthy, op.cit. pp.348-350; DiMona, op.cit. pp.267-268
33 Di Mona, op.cit. pp.268-9; Calley, op.cit. pp.88-91
33A Bilton, op.cit. p.100
34 Di Mona, op.cit. p.258
34A Bilton, op.cit. p.98
34B Peers, op.cit. p.253-6
35 Psychology Today pp.614-16
36 Calley, op.cit. pp.101-6
37 Di Mona, op.cit. pp.265,272,274
37A Bilton and Sim (TV), op. cit.
38 Ibid. pp.252-6
39 McCarthy, op.cit. p.403; Peers, op.cit. p.230
40 Hammer, op.cit. Part IV
41 McCarthy, op.cit. pp.379-80
42 Hersh, op.cit. ch.18
43 McCarthy, op.cit pp.282-86
44 Peers, op.cit. p.251; Lewy, op.cit. pp.356-57
